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PREFACE 
The last few years have seen a higher inflation rate in New 
Zealand compared with the country's trading partners, a price decline 
for the country's unprocessed export products, and increasing ove rseas 
access problems for these products. Hence more concern is currently 
being expressed for the reduction in processing and marketing costs as 
well as support for the concept of added value to traditional export 
products. Research undertaken by New Zealand R.A.s can be viewed as 
invaluable given this situation. 
On the other hand, the pressure to reduce government spending is 
leading to the questioning of the level of government support for R.A.s 
(as opposed to industry support). 
This Discussion Paper is concerned with this issue of government 
assistance to R.A.s. A review of the relevant arguments for continued 
government assistance is presented, further questions posed, and 
research useful in deciding how to resolve some of the arguments is 
suggested. 
P.D. Chudleigh 
Director 
( iii) 

CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
There has recently been some discussion on Ne w Zealand Government 
involvement in funding of agricultural research (see, for example, 
National Business Review, 17/1/83). The arguments become more heated as 
economic pressures force both cuts in government expenditure and closer 
monitoring of the efficient use of remaining expenditure. It has been 
advocated that there be less reliance on public research and development 
(R & D) spending through bodies such as the Department of Scientific and 
Industrial Research (D.S.loR.) and more private sector commitment. 
This paper reviews some of the issues related to the funding of 
agricultural processing research, in particular the funding of one type 
of research organisation - the Research Association. Research 
Associations (R.A.s) are partnerships of government and particular 
industries, some of which undertake processing oriented agricultural 
research. 
Chapter 2 of this paper provides some background to R.A.s and an 
overview of the current sources of their funds. The current formula for 
determining the level of government funding to R.A.s also is described. 
In Chapter 3 some of the issues involved in government and industry 
funding of primary processing research are discussed. The question of 
the profitability of primary processing research is addressed in an 
attempt to find evidence of market failure. Various factors are 
described which affect the profitability of research but hard evidence 
of the profitability of processing research or the existence of market 
failure is shown to be lacking~ 
Despite this lack of data it is argued on ~ priori grounds that the 
characteristics of research and the nature of social objectives are 
likely to lead to a misallocation of research resources from a community 
point of view if funding decisions are left only to private interests. 
The factors leading to this misallocation, both in respect to the amount 
and type of research undertaken, are described in the second half of 
Chapter 3. The need to overcome the effect of these factors provides 
the rationale for government involvement in research organisation and 
funding. 
While some government involve ment in processing research appears 
justified a large proportion of processing research will be carried out 
efficiently by private interests, either through in-house research or 
through involvement with R.A.s. In Chapter 4 of this report the 
distribution of the direct benefits and costs of this important 
component of processing research is considered. In addition some issues 
related to the private funding of such research through the use of 
levies and patents are discussed. 
J. 
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Finally, in Chapter 5 some conclusions are dra wn with respect to 
the role of government in R.A.s, and the need for further research. 
CHAPTER 2 
RESEARCH ASSOCIATIONS 
2.1 The Research Associations 
There 
partnerships 
the:-
are currently twelve R.A.s. These were formed as 
are between the government and various industries, and 
Building Research Association (BRANZ) 
Coal Research Association (CRANZ) 
Concrete Research Association (CONRANZ) 
Dairy Research Institute (DRINZ) 
Fertiliser Manufacturers Research Association 
Heavy Engineering Research Association 
Leather & Shoe Research Association 
Logging Industry Research Association 
Meat Industry Research Institute 
Pottery and Ceramics Research Association 
Res. Inst. of Textile Services 
Wool Research Organisation 
(FMRA) 
(HERA) 
(LSRA) 
(LIRANZ) 
(MIRlNZ) 
(PCRA) 
(RITS) 
(WRONZ) 
The R.A.s were established at different times, though the 
government has been involved in them from the start. For example, a 
Dairy Research Organisation was formed in 1928, with the Dairy Produce 
Board contributing $1 for $1 to match a grant made by the DSIR. In 
1947 the Institute was incorporated and was subsequently financed by the 
New Zealand Dairy Board and government. 
The Meat 
Organisation 
Industry Research Institute and 
were established in 1955 and 1960 
the Wool Research 
respectively. 
The R.A.s are generally involved in research on conversion and 
processing of New Zealand's primary commodities into export products. 
The objectives of R.A.s are to stimulate the use of new technologies and 
technical expertise within industry, to encourage the use of local 
materials and the development of new products and processes, and to 
provide testing services. In practice Research Association research 
tends to fall into three main categories. These are cost-reducing 
innovations, development of new products from existing commodities and 
development of new processes which can be used by overseas processors to 
expand/maintain demand for New Zealand's raw materials. 
Thus R.A.s deal mainly with the processing sector, whereas 
government departments such as DSIR and Ministry of Agriculture and 
Fisheries (MAF) generally concentrate their research efforts on the 
production sector. The allocation of public funding (1.e. to DSIR, MAF, 
R.A.s and universities) for production and processing research has been 
estimated at approximately 83% and 17% respectively (Sorrenson, 1977). 
3. 
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es timated at approximately 83% and 17% respectively (Sorrenson, 1977). 
While this ignores research undertaken in the private sector, it 
indicates that processing research attracts a relatively small 
proportion of public expenditure. 
The three main R.A.s undertaking agriculturally related processing 
research are DRINZ, MIRINZ and WRONZ. Although several of the other 
R.A.s have undertaken projects which indirectly affect the agricultural 
sector (eg. BRANZ's work on the serviceability of available flooring 
materials for freezing works; LSRA's split deliming process for 
production of pickled pelts) they are not directly involved in 
agricultural processing research and are therefore not dealt with in 
detail in this report. 
The Boards of Directors of Research Associations comprise 
representatives of each of the sectors which contribute funds (i.e. 
Producer Boards, Industry and government), as well as other technical 
professional people such as University and R.A. staff. Research and 
development programmes are guided by various sub-committees of the 
Boards (e.g. the Technical Advisory Committee of DRINZ). 
Because of their involvement in funding and decision making 
producers and processors can have a major influence on the type of 
research undertaken, and thereby ensure that it is closely allied to 
their needs. In addition, the R.A.s benefit through close contact with 
industry (liaison, co-ordination, communication) and through being 
subject to external review. 
The system of funding R.A.s is. to some extent» an application of 
the customer/contractor principle (Rothschild, 1971). Under the concept 
the customer says what he wants; the contractor does it (if he can); 
and the customer pays. The customer may be the actual user of the 
research results such as a company, or a government department 
representing the user of the product or process. The contractor is, in 
this case, the R.A. A ma jor advantage of this type of system 1.8 tha t 
'accountability and responsibility in the setting of research pr1.orities 
(and the use of research funds) are likely to be encouraged if those 
benefi ting from research ha ve to pay for that research" (lAC, 1976). 
2.2 Funding of Research Associations 
Government expenditure on R.A.s is det'ailed in Table 1. It 
co mpr ises approxi matel y 3 per cent of the go vernment science budge t 
expenditure and around 60 per cent of DSIR grants to scientific 
or~anisations in NZ and overseas (eg. universities. the Royal Society. 
the Commonwealth Agricultural Bureaux). Thus, the amount of government 
expenditure on R.A.s Is small, compared to both total government R&D 
expenditure, and to the government budget. Government funding of 
agricultural research was around 1.2 per cent of the gross domestic 
product derived from the agricultural sector in 1980 (Bushnell, 1982). 
It has been estimated by the National Research Advisory Council that, in 
addition to government research, the private sector contributed around 
20 per cent of the funds for agricultural research in New Zealand in 
TABLE 1
NZ Government (DSIR) Expenditure on R.A.'s
5.
=======================================================================
Research Year ($000 )a
Association 1979-80 1980-81 1981-82 1982-83b
--- - _. --
--- ---_._.- _._- -- --
BRANZ 413 597 689 766
CRANZ 242 288 297 358
CONRANZ 98 117 316 284
DRINZ 1055 1193 1355 1438
FMRA 195 288 267 339
HERA 21 128 172 316
LSRA 136 122 189 227
LlRANZ 94 165 135 229
MIRINZ 720 1141 1091 1299
PCRA 128 115 126 109
RITS 54 71 55 79
WRONZ 658 782 893 958
Total . 381'4" 5007 5585 6402
==== ==== ---- ====
==========~==a===~===============QQ~=====~=============================
a
b
Annual operating costs excludes contributions to new buildings.
Estimates
SOURCE: Annual Report of the Department of Scientific and Industrial
Research (various issues)
6.
per cent of sectoral GOP, and Bushnell (1982) suggests that this is
lower than many other OECD countries.
In Tables 2 to 4 sources of funds for the three main Research
Associations which undertake agriculturally related processing research
(MIRINZ, DRINZ, WRONZ) are detailed. It can be seen that their funds
derive partly from government sources and partly from producer bodies.
Only a small proportion comes directly from private sources but funds
provided by the producer boards (N.Z.Meat Producers Board (NZMPB), N.Z.
Dairy Board (NZDBL N.Z. Wool Board, (NZWB» generally are indirectly
obtained via levies on product sales.
It appears that there has been a change in sources of funds over
time, with an increasing proportion of R~. funds coming from producers
and processors. This lessening dependence on government funding is
intentional government policy as over time the industries become better
organised and able to self-fund research. The shift from government to
industry financing has been necessary to maintain or increase research
funds,1 which suggests some willingness by producers and processors to
increase their support for research. It should be noted, though, that
whilst the proportion of government funds has declined, the total sum
contributed by government in real terms has been maintained or increased
marginally. Thus, R~.s are still heavily supported by government, and
a considerable amount of government funded research in the three
primary processing sectors (meat, wool and dairy) is effected through
R.A.s.
2.3 Criteria for Funding Research Associations
The current allocation of government funds to R.A.s is based on
the concept of an 'ultimate size' for each R.A. This places a ceiling
on government contributions at a level of activity considered
appropriate for that industry. Ultimate size. was determined by the
National Research Advisory Council based on:
(i) the national importance and potential of the industry;
(if) the effectiveness of the R.A.;
(iii) the receptiveness of the industry in applying research results;
(iv) the potential contribution of science and technology to the
expansion, efficiency and diversification of the industry; and
(v) the influence which the R.A. has within the industry (DSIR,
pers. comm.).
1 Government contributions to Dairy Research Instit ute for example,
declined from over 40% of total DR! funds in 1973-80, to around 28%
in 1983. Similarly, government contributions to wool research
formed 45% of WRDNZ budget in 1979/80, but only 36% in 1981/82.
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TABLE 2
Sources of Research Funds for DRINZ
=======================================================================
Yeara 1980-81 1981-82
INCOME $ % $ %
NZ Dairy Board 1,836 ,434 60 4,187,000 74
DSIR 1,200,000 40 1,504,923 26
3,036 ,434 100 5,691 ,923 100
========= =========
Less
Capital Grants
Buildings
Plus
Sundry Income
interest, royalties,
fees, sales, etc.
Total
138,100
132,205
3,030,539
=::::11=======
2,069,000
241,644
3,864,567
==::::::==:::lll:=
a Year ended 31st March
SOURCE: Department of Scientific and Industrial Research
TABLE 3
Sources of Research Funds for MIRINZ
========================================================================
Year
Income
DSIR
NZ Freezing COe Assn.
NZ Meat Producers Board
Bacon Curers &Meat Processors
Independent Meat Exporters
Meat Export Devp. Co (NZ) Ltd.
Defiance Processors Ltd.
Others
1980-81
$
889,640
770,979
770,979
2,980
3,320
830
830
208
%
36
31
31
1981-82
$
1 ,111 ,382
720,658
720,658
3,720
5,200
1,040
1 ,040
3,640
%
43
28
28
Plus
Sundry Income
- Interest, fees, etc
Building A!C Interest
Development Projects A!C
Total
2,439,766 100
==========
113,033·
2,042
356,603
2,911 ,444
=======::1:::1
2,567,338 100
=========
241,137
841
185,669
2,994,982
===========
SOURCE: Department of Scientific and Industrial Research
9.
TABLE 4
Sources of Research Funds for WRONZ
Yell r 1980-81 1981-82
- --_._-- - -_.-
Income $ % $ %
NZ Wool Board 807 ,000 42 1,344,310 51
DSIR 771 ,034 40 890,400 34
Industrial Members 337 ,474 18 413,364 15
1,915,508 100 2,648,074 100
========= =========
Other
Interest 3,859 7,365
Rent 5,037 5,156
Sundry 86,772 112,272
Total 2,011 ,176 2 ,772 ,867
========= =========
========================================================================
SOURCE: Department of Scientific and Industrial Research
I 
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For example, the 'ultimate size' of funds considered appropriate for 
DRINZ and MIRINZ was $3.7 million per annum, and for WRONZ was $2.47 
million for 1982/ 83. The government pays a $1 for $1 subsidy, up to a 
limit on net expenditure equivalent to 40 per cent of the ultimate size 
of the R.A., then $1 for $2 above 40 per cent up to a limit of 100 per 
cent. In effect, this means that government support is limited to a 
maximum of 40 per cent of the specified 'ultimate size' of the R.A. No 
government contribution is made above this, and as the main R.A.s have 
already reached the 'ultimate size', all additional funding is expected 
to come from industry. Automatic adjustment to the limits is provided 
for based on the Consumer Price Index. 
Industry contributions to R.A.s are supplied mainly through the 
Producer Boards from funds obtained via levies on product sales. The 
Boards tend to make a lump-sum payment to the R.A.s, which is only 
indirectly related to either the volume or value of product sold. It 
appears that no specific criteria are utilised in determining the 
contribution, but, rather an ad hoc decision is made dependent upon 
factors such as ability to pay and ReA. requirements. 
Other industry contributions come from private processing 
companies and organisations (such as the wool scourers, brokers and 
buyers, meat processors, etc.) also on an ad hoc basis. 
CHAPTER 3 
FACTORS AFFECTING GOVERNMENT ASSISTANCE TO 
PRIMARY PROCE SSING RE SEARCH 
Government assistance to primary processing research can be 
justified largely on the grounds of market failure, national 
prof i tabi Ii ty and ef f icienc y of resource use. Ho wever, there rna y be 
other important reasons (such as facilitating adjustment to change, and 
environmental conservation) why primary processing research should not 
be wholly funded and administered by the private sector. These will be 
discussed later in this Chapter. First, though, the basic question of 
whether such research is profitable is addressed. 
3.1 The Profitability of Agricultural Research 
The profitability of research is of interest because it can provide 
evidence, albeit circumstantial, of under or over-investment in 
research. In theory in a competitive market economy investment funds 
should flow into various investment alternatives until the marginal 
returns from those alternatives are equalised. In an imperfectly 
competiti ve world this tendency can be severely dampened; however, if 
marginal returns on investment in research are significantly higher than 
alternative investment yields then market failure may be indicated and 
government involvement may be justified. 
Economic analyses of both specific research projects and 
agricultural research in aggregate have been undertaken in a number of 
countries. While these studies relate mainly to agricultural production 
research they are relevant to this discussion on processing research 
because, in many cases, the nature and distribution of the benefits are 
similar. The studies indicate that agricultural research is generally 
highly profitable and has a significant effect on the rate of increase 
in productivity (Arndt and Ruttan, 1977. See Appendix 1 for a summary 
of analyses). If this is the case in New Zealand, then market failure 
may be indicated. This may provide a case for considering the need for 
government intervention to foster a more efficient level of research. 
Unfortunately, however, few analyses of profitability of either 
agricultural production research or processing research are available 
for either New Zealand or Australia. There have been studies of 
technical change which are revie wed by Po well and Bushnell (1981). 
These studies include Hussey (1969), Johnson (1970) and Longmire and 
Po well (1973). Powell and Bushnell (1981) calcula ted a technical 
change index, and suggest that in both New Zealand and Australia 
"technological change is a major contributor to economic growth and 
)1. 
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through the implicit increase in productivity, Is a major vehicle
through which farmers can increase their incomes ". The most recent
aggregate study in Australia (Hastings, 1981) confirms these results.
The Australian lAC attempted to evaluate the returns to a large
segment of rural research undertaken by the CSIRO's Division of
Entomology (IAC/CSIRO, 1980). While the study indicated the value of
the research, it still only provided a limited indication of the overall
profitability of research. However, the study concluded from the
available evidence that agricultural research is, and will continue to
be, highly valuable both to producers and to the community. There is no
reason to believe that this conclusion cannot be applied to the New
Zealand case equally, though the shortage of specific analyses
especially in the processing area, should be highlighted.
The opinion that agricultural research in New Zealand is profitable
is supported by Sorrenson (1977) in his review of resource allocation in
N~w Zealand agricultural research. He pointed out that a general
conclusion reached in overseas studies is that the absolute value of the
related output of the research effort has the most significant bearing
on the profitability of the research. Given the significance of
agriculture in the New Zealand economy it seems reasonable to assume
that, on an aggregate basis, agricultural research has been, and will
continue to be, profitable.
Sorrenson's work related mainly to agricultural production
research; however, with respect to processing research he suggested that
more government involvement in processing research was justified given
the contribution that processing makes to national income and the value
of gross exports.2
Sorrenson found that, in general, production activities were
significantly better served with research than processing activities.
He indicated that returns (in terms of foreign exchange and local
employment) from additional research in the processing sector were
likely to be considerably greater than in the production sector.
However, given that the benefits from many processing developments can
be satisfactorily appropriated by private companies undertaking their
own research, it would appear that, by only considering government and
R.A. expenditure on resea rch, Sorrenson may have seriously unde r
estimated the level of processing research expenditure. Private
research expenditure by companies is difficult to quantify, but could be
considerable, especially in horticultural and crop processing areas, not
served by R.A.s.
2 In arriving at this conclusion Sorrenson took agricultural
expenditure and manpower data for the DSIR, MAF, agricultural
Research Associations and the universities for the years 1968/69 -
1975/76 and classified them into 15 NRAC agricultural activity
areas. He then compared this research expenditure for each
activity area with the contribution the area made to national
income and gross export earnings.
13. 
With respect to processing research there seems to have been some 
highly profitable processing research undertaken by the Research 
Associations and others, but no studies are available to assess the 
economics of the total R.A. research programmes. Examples often cited 
of profitable R.A. research include the development by the Dairy 
Research Institute of "anhydrous milk fat" products for the South East 
Asian market, and cheese products acceptable to the Japanese market. 
Also, the concept of carcass electrical stimulation developed by the 
Meat Industry Research Institute and wool scouring technology developed 
by the Wool Research Organisation are examples of worthwhile processing 
research. 
As mentioned above, agricultural production research has been found 
to be profitable in many situations. It can probably be inferred from 
this that agricultural processing research is also likely to be 
profitable. This assertion is supported by Freebairn et al (1982) who 
showed that there is no reason to argue that research opportunities are 
greater or research costs are less at one stage in the production and 
marketing chain than another. 
Although there is little information available to 
profitability of processing research in New Zealand it is 
list some factors which will affect that profitability. 
which are discussed in more detail by McLeigh and Wonder 
outlined below. 
3.1.1 Industry size and growth. 
assess the 
possible to 
These factors 
(1982), are 
Industry size and growth directly affect the nation's returns from 
research, and in general, more will be gained from research which 
reduces costs by a given amount in a large industry than from the same 
unit cost reduction in a small industry. 
The growth rate of industries also needs to be taken into account, 
as this will affect their size in future years. 
3.1.2 The cost of research. 
The costs of undertaking research are likely to vary significantly 
across different industries. It may be more difficult to achieve a 
given cost reduction in a large industry because it has historically 
attracted a large proportion of research funds and may have fewer 
opportunities for cost savings than smaller industries elsewhere in the 
economy. On the other hand, a large industry is likely to have much of 
the infra-structure necessary to undertake further research. These 
well-established industries may face lower costs of conducting further 
research than would those which have no existing investment in research. 
As noted earlier diminishing proportion subsidies paid by government to 
R.A.s recognise this cost-of-estab1ishment factor. 
14. 
The more widely and quickly the results from research are 
implemented, the greater will be society's gain from an innovation. It 
is difficult to identify factors responsible for variations in adoption 
rates, but differences do exist across industries which affect the 
magnitude of returns to research and must therefore be accounted for in 
the allocation of research funds. 
The adoption rate of new technology overseas can be equally 
important, in cases such as the wool industry, where the intention is to 
expand overall demand for New Zealand commodities by supplying overseas 
processors with lower cost technology. 
3.1.4 The responsiveness of New Zealand production to changes in price 
The social gains from research will be greater the more production 
expands (or, the more production is prevented from falling) following 
implementation of primary processing research results. However, 
production in New Zealand may not expand if the research results are 
also implemented in the rest of the world, and world prices fall 
following expansion in total world production, or if increased New 
Zealand production would depress the world price (i.e. if the export 
demand elasticity facing New Zealand is small). Moreover, there may be 
reasons why reductions in processing costs as a result of research are 
not transmitted back to the producer. This may be because the 
processing companies have some monopoly power and can retain additional 
profits, or because the elasticity of substitution of marketing inputs 
for farm products is large. In the latter case, benefits to producers 
from processing research can be small, zero or they may even suffer a 
loss, depending on the elasticity of demand (Alston and Scobie, 1983). 
3.1.5 The responsiveness of quantity demanded to changes in price 
For a commodity which is mainly exported, research will benefit New 
Zealand producers and processors more, the greater the responsiveness of 
foreign demand to changes in price of New Zealand exports. The degree 
of responsiveness of foreign demand to price changes in New Zealand 
exports increases as New Zealand's share of world production declines; 
as world demand elasticities increase; as supply responses in the rest 
of the world decline, an'd as the degree of trade protection decreases 
(i.e. the price transmission elasticity approaches unity). Thus, cost-
reducing research into commodities which have a small share of the world 
market or face few barriers to trade, will be of most benefit to New 
Zealand. 
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3.1.6 The level of domestic consumption. 
Finally, the smaller the domestic consumption of a product, the 
smalle r will tend to be Ne w Zea land's benef it f rom research int 0 the 
processing of that product. 
In conclusion, while some general observations can be made on 
aspects of profitability, the lack of detailed studies on the 
profitability of primary processing research in New Zealand means that 
no empirical evidence can be provided as to the existence or otherwise 
of market failure. Nevertheless, it can be argued on a priori grounds 
that, in some cases, because of the characteristics of research and the 
nature of social objectives, a misallocation of research resources from 
society's point of view may occur. Such misallocation may occur as an 
underinvestment in research or with respect to the type of research 
undertaken. Factors leading to these effects are discussed in Sections 
3.2 and 3.3. 
3.2 Factors Reducing Investment in Primary Processing Research 
A number of factors, which tend to reduce investment in primary 
processing research are described below. 
3.2.1 External benefits. 
It is a feature of some types of research that the private 
researcher is unable to prevent others from utilising his findings. The 
more the research is "informatio"n" or "management" based, rather than 
''process'' or ''product'' based, the more difficult it becomes to prevent 
others from-using it and benefitting from it. Similarly, external 
benefits tend to be greater for more basic types of research. 
It can be argued that if all the benefits accrue to those who bear 
the cost of the research, then profit oriented firms under competition 
would arrive at a general optimum (private and social) by equating 
marginal costs and marginal returns. If, however, not all of these, 
benefits accrue to these firms (i.e. if all the external benefits 
cannot be internalised), they would equate marginal costs only to the 
point where the returns that they can capture are equalised (Fishel, 
1973). Under these circumstances it is possible that companies would 
undertake less research than is desirable from the community's point of 
view. 
Patents and Breeders' Rights legislation is a method of 
internalising some of the externalities associated with research. Facts 
and natural laws are excluded from patents and patents may be difficult 
to apply to information that cannot be translated into a product or 
process~ However as the research undertaken by the R.A.s is generally 
process oriented, many of the new developments would appear to be 
patentable. There seems, therefore, to be potential for industry to 
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reap directly many of the benefits of processing research. It could 
thus be argued that, because the extent of external benefits can be 
limited, industry should undertake a significant level of processing 
research without government subsidies. 
The existence of external benefits may also be a factor 
discouraging companies from co-operating in R.A. research and realising 
the significant economies of scale that can result. Research benefits 
must be shared amongst all participating parties and thus, from an 
indi vidual company's point of vie w, substantial external benefits may 
exist for competitors. Under these circumstances the 'carrot' of 
government matching industry contributions provides a strong incentive 
to them to contribute to R.A.s. 
3.2.2 Distortions in the economy. 
It is possible that some distortions in the economy may discourage 
processing research. One form of distortion which is relevant in New 
Zealand relates to the over-valued exchange rate. This represents a tax 
on exporters and may reduce the funds available for processing research. 
In other cases the structure of the processing industry may not 
encourage research. For example, where a processing industry is 
protected and competition bet ween companies is limited, companies may 
have little incentive to undertake research to improve profitability. 
3.2.3 Time preferences, costs and risk. 
Research typically requires the outlay of substantial resources 
over long periods before a financial return can be expected. Further, 
more than most other investment activities, research is inherently 
uncertain, with a high risk that anyone research project may not lead 
to results of economic significance. These features of research may 
lead to an underinvestment in research by private firms, particularly 
where firms in an industry are small. Underwood (1973), for example, 
has argued that without government involvement, industry will 
concentrate too heavily on short-ruri projects which offer quick and 
relatively certain returns, and neglect long term studies and basic 
research, to the detriment of the overall industry and the nation. 
In principle, a case can be established for government involvement 
to counter private underinvestment in profitable but risky investments 
(see Hirshleifer, 1966; Arrow and Linds, 1970). Financial risks borne 
by a government are spread across a large number of taxpayers and can be 
pooled for a large number of investments. Consequently, the total cost 
of risk-bearing is insignificant and, therefore, governments can afford 
to ignore uncertainty to a large extent in evaluating public 
investments. In practice, the difficulties of determining the extent of 
underinvestment due to risk and establishing an appropriate policy to 
counter it are likely to be substantial. 
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3.2.4 Maintaining international competitiveness.
A common argument raised in support of continued government funding
of research is that most of New Zealand's competitors in overseas
markets spend massive sums on research. (It was noted for example, in
Chapter 2 that New Zealand's funding of agricultural research at 1.5% of
sectoral GDP is lower than that of many OECD countries). If New Zealand
is to be internationally competitive, it may be necessary to subsidise
research at levels similar to other countries, if industry is not
prepared or able to do so. The difficulties in actually demonstrating
ma rket failure in this area are recognised, though it should be noted
that the proportion of private funding appears to be low in New Zealand
compared to other countries. This possibly results from a weaker
corporation structure in New Zealand, with fewer large companies willing
and able to undertake private research.
3.3 Factors Affecting The Type of Research Undertaken
In the previous section it was shown how some factors may tend to
reduce the level of research being undertaken by private interests. In
this section the type of the research is considered. Because of the
characteristics of research, and the importance of certain social
objectives in the community, the type of research undertaken by private
interests may be different from that which is socially optimal. Some
factors which may le~d to this situation are outlined below.
3.3.1 Basic versus applied research.
It has been argued that there may be private underinvestment in
'basic,3 research, because the external benefits of such research are
large. It would appear that primary processing research is rarely, if
ever, truly basic - all research done by primary processing research
agencies ul t ima tely has the ob ject i ve of commercial ut ilisa t ion, but
such research may still yield external benefits. External benefits are
likely to diminish (i.e. become internalised) as research moves from the
more basic to the more 'applied,4 end of the research spectrum.
I
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'Basic' research is that which has no specific application in view,
but is necessary to ensure the advancement of knowledge.
'Applied' research covers both strategic and tactical research and
provides a broad bas is of. kno wledge for, or ma y be enti reI y
directed at, the solution of specific problems.
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3.3.2 Research to assist particular industries.
It has been shown (Scobie, 1979) that an industrial protection
policy, such as New Zealand's, using tariffs against imported
manufactured goods can lead to considerable bias against the
agricultural sector. The effects are firstly to raise the price of
manufactured inputs, and secondly to encourage investment in the
manufacturing sector. Availability of resources to agriculture is
thereby reduced, making the generally unprotected agricultural sector
less competitive. Finally, and most important, the price of foreign
exchange tends to be maintained artificially low (Scobie and Johnson,
1974) making the export of products less attractive. To compensate for'
this bias, assistance to the agricultural sector could be justified,
perhaps in the form of a research subsidy.
Within the primary sector government may wish to assist or
encourage a particular sub-sector. Some factors affecting the returns
to research funds allocated to particular sectors were discussed in
Section 3.1 and more or less weight can be given to these factors
according to government objectives. For example, although the costs of
research are likely to be higher in a new industry, government may
allocate more funds to research in that industry to encourage
diversification of total production.
Also new industries usually have no strong producer base to provide
research funds during establishment and may suffer from inadequate
research. Government assistance may be justified in such cases,
particularly in the short term, to co-ordinate and supplement producer
funds and to ensure that the long term potential of the industry is
realised.
3.3.3 Conservation and environmental research.
Concern for conservation of the environment has been stated as an
example of the different valuation which the community, on the one hand,
and individuals, on the other hand, place on the use of certain
resources (lAC, 1976).
Certain types of research are therefore likely to receive public
preference because of their environmental impact, or because of the
benefits w'hich extend into future generations.5 With regard to the
processing sector, government intervention in areas such as research on
low-cost waste treatment systems, may be one way to ensure that effluent
disposal and other pollution externalities are reduced.
5 This differs from the time preference argument proffered earlier,
Which tends to be a shorter term issue.
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3.3.4 Research facilitating adjustment to change. 
(a) Market Conditions 
The ques tion of producers' inabili t y to adjus t to changes in the 
physical and economic environment is closely linked to market failure in 
optimising the allocation of resources, and is relevant to New Zealand 
at the current time. 
The whole rural sector would be able to cope more easily with 
physical and economic change if the resources at the disposal of farmers 
and processors could be made more mobile and/or used more efficiently. 
In this respect the government may wish to enhance the productivity and 
mobility of resources through fostering research and innovation. For 
.example, processors and exporters would benefit from research to provide 
the flexibility to adapt to changing world market conditions and to 
develop new products for new markets, using the existing supply of raw 
commodities in New Zealand. 
Research may also playa role in moderating the continuing cost-
price squeeze by facilitating structural adjustment. Without research 
many of the long term adjustments would still take place under the 
pressure to maintain incomes. but the changes would possibly be more 
disruptive or be made more slowly. 
(b) Labour and Incomes 
Research, sponsored or directed by government, may also provide a 
tool for labour and income policies. For example, research to expedite 
structural change may moderate the adverse effects on the employment of 
labour both on farms and in the industrial sector. The effect of 
research on the size of the labour force is determined by two factors. 
These are firstly, how much the reductions in cost expand output or 
throughput and thus increase the need for labour. This, in turn, 
depends on the elasticity of product supply and demand, and the extent 
to which costs are reduced by research. Secondly, research may 
facilitate the substitution of capital for labour, and any increase in 
output induced by research might be undertaken by a smaller, but more 
highly mechanised labour force. 
The IAC (1976) concluded that most agricultural production research 
in Australia has been land saving rather than labour saving, and that, 
in any case,· labour saving innovations reduce costs and indirectly 
expand opportunities for employment. It is not possible to generalise 
on labour/capital substitution in the processing sector, as each case 
depends on the specific industry or process involved. However, overall 
employment opportunities are likely to increase in the long run if, 
through research, costs are reduced, and 'value-adding' opportunities in 
the processing sector are exploited. 
1 
I 
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Another factor relating to employment effects is the relatively 
high elasticity of factor substitution of marketing services for raw 
commodities that is likely to exist in some processing industries. Many 
processing and marketing services are labour-intensive so that 
processing research is likely to expand overall employment 
opportunities. Whilst there may be a net national gain from research 
and subsequent substitution, primary producers may not gain anything or 
may actually lose out if the use of raw commodities is diminished in 
favour of additional processing and marketing services. 
In addition to existing patterns of processing the government may 
see "further processing" as a valuable source of employment 
op~ortunities in industries where unemployment is high. Under these 
circumstances government involvement may be justified on employment 
generation grounds, if not economic efficiency grounds. 
Finally, research' can contribute to the stability of an industry 
(and hence, producer) income, by reducing market price variability, and 
maintaining or stabilising overseas demand (through, for example, 
diversifying the product range and end-use of raw commodities). 
3.3.5 Overseas versus domestic research. 
Due to the high cost of undertaking research there is some question 
as to whether some types of research should be carried out in New 
Zealand, or research results imported from overseas and merely applied 
to the New Zealand situation. For example, it has been argued that New 
Zealand may not have a comparative advantage in basic research, and 
that this can be accessed from overseas at a very low cost (Teece, 
1983). More emphasis could then be placed on applying that overseas 
basic research to New Zealand's industrial sector. 
Whilst these arguments appear sensible, the practicalities of the 
situation make them less sound. Firstly, New Zealand has a unique set 
of problems and characteristics which research must attempt to resolve. 
For example, a certain amount of basic research in pasture and grazing-
animal production must be undertaken here, as few other regions have 
sufficient interest to devote substantial research resources to the 
area. Similarly, with 'new' crops such as kiwifruit, basic research has 
to be done here, if New Zealand wishes to remain a world-leader in 
production. 
Secondly, a considerable amount of basic and applied researc.h from 
overseas is already utilised with.in New Zealand, after having been 
adapted to specific New Zealand situations by the various R.A.s. (For 
example, mechanical de-pelting machines which were invented overseas 
have been introduced to New Zealand freezing works). 
Thirdly, basic research in New Zealand may lead to innovations and 
technology which, themselves, may have considerable export potential, in 
addition to aiding the domestic industries. Examples of such 
innovations from the past include wool scouring technology, shrink-
wrapping of meat and the manufacture of anhydrous milk fat. 
New 
Fourthly, 
Zealand 
innovations. 
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there is a need to maintain a body of scientists within 
who are capable of monitoring and utilising overseas 
Fifthly, it is questionable 'as to how long and how often New 
Zealand can obtain 'low-cost' research from overseas. Such research 
frequently comes from international organisations to which New Zealand's 
contributions appear to have been declining. Thus, importing 'low-cost' 
research, effectively subsidized by other countries, makes New Zealand a 
"free-rider". In the short term New Zealand may reap the benefits 
without bearing the costs. However, in the longer term access to such 
research results may be made more difficult by overseas research 
organisations. 
Finally, there are problems associated with obtaining overseas 
technology (Johnson, 1981; Kolm, 1981). The reality is that much of 
the useful processing research is done by large, multi-national 
companies. Access to this technology usually means relying on the 
multi-nationals, and co-operating closely on product and market control. 
In turn, this may mean a loss of freedom and restricted market access 
for New Zealand companies. Also, there may be other costs associated 
with attracting multi-nationals to invest in, or co-operate with, the 
processing sector. For example, government grants may be needed as an 
incentive to multi-nationals, especially in a country such as New 
Zealand, with a relatively small domestic economy (The EconOmist, 
19/2/83) • 
Thus, in order to ensure that appropriate basic research is done 
within New Zealand, that a body of scientists is supported to undertake 
this research and that undue dependence on multi-national companies be 
avoided, some government assistance to research may be desirable. 
3.3.6 Other!!:.~ for government involvement in R.A.s. 
A number of other reasons for government involvement in primary 
processing research can be advanced which include the following. 
Research Associations perform a number of functions for which 
producers and processors could not be expected to pay. These include 
liaison and co-operation in education, training of staff, staff 
secondment to overseas and other New Zealand institutions and sharing of 
equipment. The transfer of technology through visits, conferences and 
secondments increases inter~ction and integration of research effort, 
and reduces New Zealand industry insularity. Whilst this has no 
immediately obvious 'pay-offs', there are long term benefits to both 
industry and the nation. 
Another argument for maintaining government involvement has been 
that they ensure that R.A.s remain independent and impartial 
organisations. Such autonomy is equally important for research 
scientists and for holding sector interests and competitors together as 
one unified group. 
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Finally, it may be more acceptable internationally and internally 
for New Zealand to support the agricultural sector indirectly, through 
funding production and processing research, than to pay direct price and 
income subsidies. 
3.4 Conclusion 
While little evidence can be cited to indicate market failure in 
the provision of primary processing research, a number of factors can be 
specified which may lead to such failure in some circumstances. These 
factors relate mainly to the characteristics of research and to the 
nature of the government's social objectives. 
Where a significant divergence between private research performance 
and public research objectives is likely to occur government involvement 
may be justified to increase the amount of research undertaken to a more 
socially optimal level. (This involvement may be of either a 
legislative or a financial nature). However, government intervention to 
compensate for market failure or to achieve government objectives should 
not take place unless the social costs of intervention are less than the 
social benefits. The appropriate level of government involvement cannot 
be determined without more information on the nature and extent of 
market failure. 
CHAPTER 4 
BENEFITS AND COSTS OF PRIMARY PROCESSING RESEARCH 
In Chapter 3 a number of factors related to market failure were 
presented which together form the basis of the case for government 
involvement in the funding of processing research through ReA.s. While 
some government involvement appears jus~ified, a substantial proportion 
of processing research will be adequately handled and funded by private 
interests (perhaps through R.A.s), with the direct benefits and costs 
being distributed via the price mechanism. The distribution of the 
direct costs and benefits of research is of interest because it has 
implications for the structure of funding arrangements. The 
distribution processes are described and discussed in this Chapter, 
together with a discussion of issues related to industry funding of 
research. 
The direct benefits of research and the distribution of those 
benefits between producers, processors and consumers depends on several 
factors. These include where the research applies in the system, the 
nature and extent of the shifts in the supply and demand functions due 
to resea rch, elastici ties of factor suppl y and product demand, fac tor 
cost shares, and the elasticities of substitution between inputs (Alston 
and Scobie, 1982). 
On the grounds of both equity and efficiency, it may be reasonable 
to assume that those who directly benefit from research should bear the 
costs of such research. In line with this principle, it is sometimes 
argued that government should bear some of the cost of agricultural 
production and processing research because some of the benefits flow on 
to consumers. The tax-payer is seen as a proxy for the consumer in this 
argument. However, the case is not that simple, as it ignores the fact 
that a large proportion of New Zealand's product is consumed overseas. 
It also ignores the process by which costs and benefits are passed 
between sectors via the price mechanism. 
This process is described in the following sections. In the final 
section (4.4), issues related to the use of levies and other methods of 
raising industry funds for research are discussed. 
4.1 The Distribution of Research Gains 
The direct benef its of much research (ie. lea ving aside external 
effects on other sectors) occur in the form of lower per unit production 
or processing costs. Greater cost efficiency at either the production 
or the processing stage will cause a downward shift in the supply curve, 
which has implications for prices and quantities exchanged at all stages 
of the system (Freebairn et aI, 1982~ 
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While it is not possible to estimate precisely the proportion of
direct benefits of agricultural research accruing to producers and
processors in the industry, and to domestic and foreign consumers, a
broad indication can be given of likely shares by examining the
Australian situation. The estimated shares with respect to Australian
agricul ture are sho wn in Appendix 2.4, but it must be emphas ised that
for New Zealand these should be regarded as rough orders of magnitude
only as the proportion of output exported from New Zealand is
considerably greater than from Australia.
Because much of Ne w Zealand's agricul tural output is exported,
prices for most New Zealand products are determined on the world market
(and world prices mayor may not be affected by New Zealand supply
levels). Hence, increased productivity in New Zealand will only havg
an impact on domestic prices if overseas market prices are affected,
and domestic consumers will only gain from agricultural research in the
form of lower prices to that extent. As is shown in Appendix 2 though,
the benefits from agriculural research are passed on to overseas con-
sumers only to the extent that export demand is not perfectly elastic.
In the most simple case, the distribution of the research benefits
is the same whether the cost reductions occur at either the production
or processing stage (Freebairn et aI, 1982. For more detail, see
Appendix 2.)7 The relative distribution between sectors depends on the
elasticity of final demand and the supply elasticities at each stage of
the production chain. In general, the more inelastic a sector's supply
is, relative to that of other sectors, the greater will be the share of
research benefits going to that sector.
These results are modified. but not overturned, when the
assumption of perfect competition is relaxed. The share going to the
6
7
Domestic consumers may be affected if demand for exports is not
perfectly elastic or if pricing schemes discriminate bet ween the
domestic and the export market or if little of the commodity is
exported. They may also benefit from the availability of new
products, which have generally been developed for diversification
on overseas mar.kets.
In addition, consumers benefit partly from the government subsidy
to research (in the same ratio as the costs of research are
distributed). On the other hand, a government research subsidy is
a transfer of income from tax-payers to farmers and processors.
This result is based on a specific set of assumptions. Relaxation
of the assumptions may modify the results (see, for example Alston
and Scobie (1982); these authors explore the effects of differing
values of the elasticity of factor substitution between marketing
services and raw farm products in the processing sector).
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innovating sector increases with monopoly power. According to Freebairn
et al (1982), with a pure monopoly about half of the cost reduction is
passed on in lower prices to other sectors. Uncertainty as to methods
of price setting in imperfectly competitive industries make this result
dif ficult to prove but it would appea r tha t, in the long run, a high
proportion of research-induced cost reductions are passed on.
4.2 The Distribution of Research Costs
Private funding of research usually takes the form of in~house
research expenditure or payment of a levy or contribution to a Research
Association. It is useful to determine who ultimately bears the burden
of such costs. Research expenditure, like any other variable cost,
increases per unit output costs (ie. it is an upward shift of the supply
curve of the sector paying for the research (Freebairn et al, 1982».
The increase will induce changes in prices in the other sectors. Thus,
the costs of research will tend to be distributed in the same way as the
benefits from research (represented as a downward supply curve shift),
(for more detail, see Appendix 2). Therefore, to the extent that world
export demand curves are elastic, the burden of research costs will be
borne by both producers and processors. Moreover, as the elasticity of
f'arm supply is likely to be lower than that of the processing sector, a
large proportion of the cost of research is likely to be funded by
producers rather than processors. (In light of recent research, some
qualification of these results is in order and the issue is dealt with
in Section 4.4.1.)
The benefits and costs of research incurred at anyone stage are
distributed between the different production stages and consumers in a
similar way, regardless of the stage at which the research is done.8
Thus, the argument for government intervention in research funding
because some of the benefits from research at one stage go to other
stages is not warranted (Freebairn et aI, 1982).
4.3 The Distribution of Costs and 'Benefits of Demand-Shifting Research
Analogous to the above case of cost-reducing research, the
distribution of costs and benefits of demand-shifting research can be
assessed (see Appendix 2 for more detail). In this case the aim of the
research is to shift the demand curve upwards. This can be done by
developing a ne w, higher-value product from existing supply, or by
developing a new process which can be marketed overseas to increase
overall de mand.
8 Exact symmetry of benefits and costs depends on the existence of
market competition, linear supply and demand curves, parallel
research induced shifts in curves, and zero elasticity of factor
substitution.
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Briefly, the benefits of such research will be distributed between 
producers, processors and consumers. As demand becomes more inelastic 
producers and processors are more likely to benefit from demand-
increasing research than from cost-reducing research. With respect to 
world demand for New Zealand products, less than perfectly elastic 
demand curves is not an unreasonable assumption. The sizeable share of 
many export markets held by New Zealand, and the growing number of 
barriers to free trade, both serve to reduce the elasticity of export 
demand. Even so, the elasticity of export demand is still likely to be 
large, relative to New Zealand's supply elasticity. so as with the 
previous case, the major proportion of benefits of demand-creating 
research will accrue to producers and processors. 
9n the other hand, producers and processors will only be able to 
pass on to consumers the costs of funding such research to the extent 
that demand is less than perfectly elastic. In turn, producers and 
processors will share the burden of the costs in proportion to the 
supply elasticity of each sector~ output. (The more inelastic a 
sector's supply-is relative to other sectors, the greater will be the 
research costs borne by that sector, as outlined previously). However» 
knowledge of the magnitudes of these elasticities may not be important 
if research is funded via product levies, as benefits tend to be 
distributed in a way similar to the distribution of costs. (This 
symmetry depends on the assumption of zero elasticity of substitution 
bet ween processing services and raw farm products. Alston and Scobie 
(1983) have shown that producers will obtain a lower proportion of the 
total benefits from research which shifts the demand curve, than from 
research at the farm level, if the elasticity of factor substitution is 
greater than zero). 
4.4 Issues Related to Industry Funding of Research 
Earlier in this Chapter it was noted that levies on industry can be 
utilised to finance research. Issues related to levies and other 
methods of inducing industry to fund research are covered here briefly. 
4.4.1 Levies. 
The theoretical advantage of funding research from levies on 
production is that the financial costs of the levy tend to be borne in 
the same proportion as the benefits of research are distributed. It 
should be noted, however, that recent research (Alston and Scobie, 1982) 
has shown that only under a specific set of assumptions will the 
dist ribution of cos ts and benef i ts be symmet rica!. Generall y, if the 
research applies to the stage being levied or if a fixed proportion of 
inputs (ra w com modi ties and ma rketing services) is assumed, then the 
distribution is likely to be symmetrical. If, however, research at the 
processing or marketing stage is financed by a levy on farm output, and 
the elasticity of substitution is not zero, the benefits may be 
-distributed differently from the costs. 
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In this case, producers will bear a disproportionate share of the
levy and consumers will reap a disproportionate share of the benefits,
and this represents a transfer from producers to consumers. If the
production sector is financing research in the processing sector, both
farmers and processors may underinvest in research due to this
distortion. Each group will find it comparatively profitable to support
research relating to its own technology.
With respect to the size of national benefits from research
financed via production levies, the result is unclear, and will depend
on the ownership of the processing and marketing services. This is
beca use a large proport ion of Ne w Zea land's ra w commodities are
exported, and much further processing is done overseas, sometimes using
machinery and techniques developed by Research Associations within New
Zealand.
Whilst it is perhaps not feasible to levy an industry in a more
equitable manner than directly via the product, on the assumption that
the costs and bene~it8 tend to be distributed symmetrically, the above
qualifications may serve as a note of warning. Producers should not,
perhaps, be indifferent about which stage of production pays a per unit
levy to finance processing research.
Another issue related to levies is the problem of maintaining an
adequate level of funding. As was outlined in Chapter 2, industry
funding for New Zealand Research Associations is largely obtained
through Producer Boards from levies on production.9 A similar system
operates in Australia (Underwood, 1974) whereby Trust funds are
established from production levies (generally matched, on a 1: 1 basis by
Federal Government) for financing agricultural research.
Both in New Zealand and Australia such funds have permitted a
considerable amount of research to be undertaken; however, there can be
problems with a levy system, and these have become apparent in
Australia. In Australia, it was found that despite periodic increases
in the levels of the levies, funds did not keep pace with rapidly rising
research costs as a result of inflation a.nd the increasing
sophistication of much of this research.
'The funds available are also subject to seasonal and market
fluctuations due to changes in the volume of production and prices
obtained. The consequent insecurity of income poses difficulties in the
management and planning of research programmes" (Underwood, 1974).
9 Levies paid by producers for research and promotion are often tax
deductible. This could be interpreted as amounting to a subsidy,
but it is important to distinguish bet ween normal tax deductions
and concessional deductions. Deduction of research levies is not
necessarily a concession (IAC, 1976). Such expenses are incurred
in the ea rning of income, and as such are legi ti rna te deduc tions,
regardless of who carries out the research. Moreover, in the·
absence of research expenditure, taxable income, and hence tax
payable, would presumably be 10 were
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An alternative solution offered by lAC (1976) to the problems of 
fluctua tions in levy collect ion and the research-cos t sq uee ze, is to 
use a value-of-output rather than a unit-of-output base, since value 
usually increases faster than production. They also recommend that the 
levy rate be reviewed at regular intervals. Such problems are likely to 
increase in New Zealand if R.A.s become more reliant on industry 
funding than at present, as the stabilizing influence from the large 
proportion of government funding would decline. Overall, though, the 
problems are not as significant in New Zealand. as funds are collected 
and monitored by Producer Boards, not collected directly by R.A.s from 
levies on output. Producer Boards then pay a lump sum to the R.A.s, 
which tends to stabilise their contribution. 
4.4.2 Patents. 
Freebairn et a1 (1982) have suggested that government intervention 
should be directed at establishing institutional arrangements to 
1\ internalise externalities within each stage of the production process, 
and the reby encourage pri vate funding of research. As many forms of 
technology at the processing stage are likely to be patentable this 
would appear to be an important method of achieving the objective. By 
patenting a product or process the research costs can be passed on to 
the users (Le. in this case, other processing companies). The cost of 
the pat_ent can then be incorporated into the industry's production costs 
and, to varying degrees, be passed on to the consumer. 
Significant moves have already been made by R.A.s in the direction 
of patenting. MIRlNZ, for example, patents and licences its own 
innovations and those of the collective industry. This procedure is 
quicker and easier than working through third parties, and it is also a 
way of exploiting the technology overseas. WRONZ has also moved towards 
patenting, forming partnerships in agreements with industry, to develop 
and commercialise patented technologies. Royalties could not be seen as 
a major potential source of funding for R.A.s but they do provide 
useful finance for some large scale development work. The royalt ies 
that can be earnt by an R.A. are sizeable (see Tables 2 to 4, Chapter 2) 
at up to $100,000 per annum, but this would provide only 3-5% of the 
annual running costs of a Research Association. 
4.4.3 Other methods of encouraging industry funding. 
Other methods of encouraging more funding of research by industry 
should be mentioned briefly. These methods relate to ensuring adequate 
funds are available to industry to undertake the research. 
One such method operating in the US is a venture capital market, 
ho weve r, such a rna rket has not beco me highly developed in Ne w Zealand 
despite the obvious benefits of coupling the right resources and skills. 
This shortage of capital could explain the inertia observed in the 
private sector towards research funding (Teece, 1983). 
29. 
Another method would be for R.A.s to undertake more short term 
commercial contract research for individual companies. Any profits 
could be used to subsidise longer term basic research to benefit both 
the overall industry and the nation. R.A.s could be seen to be 
competing with private researchers, but it is more likely that R.A.s 
would work on large scale projects (because of better facilities and 
equipment and long term, co-ordinated funding). 

CHAPTER 5 
CON CLU SION S 
A number of issues related to government funding of R~.s have been 
discussed in this paper. It was suggested that research in the primary 
processing sector could be profitable to New Zealand as a whole, though 
the lack of quantitative assessment of this is stressed. In view of the 
fact that the main direct beneficiaries of research are probably the 
producers. and processors, it seems reasonable that they should bear a 
significnt proportion of the costs of the research. However, a number 
of other arguments were advanced in Chapter 3 which suggested that 
continued government involvement in the funding of primary processing 
research may be justified in a number of cases. It seems likely that, 
in the absence of a subsidy, some worthwhile research would not be 
undertaken by industry. 
This market failure, which may lead to a less than optimal amount 
of research, is. due partly to the nature of research. There may be 
external benefits from which people other than the innovator can gain, 
and for which the innovator cannot be expected to pay. In addition, 
there may be distortions in the rest of the economy which make it 
desirable or n~cessary to compensate the less protected sectors, perhaps 
through subsidising their research programmes. Similarly, if other 
countries have government assistance to research, it may be necessary 
for New Zealand's Government to assist its processing sector in order to 
maintain interna tional competi ti venes s. Thus, by cont ributing some 
funds to the R~.s, the government can ensure that an amount of research 
closer to the optimal is undertaken in New Zealand's primary processing 
sector. 
Government assistance to research may also be justified to ensure 
that appropriate types of research are undertaken. For instance, 
government funding of 'basic' research is widely accepted, but funding 
of 'applied' research may also be justified because of substantial 
external benefits, and because of the problems in accessing it from 
overseas. Funding of research in certain sectors may also be justified 
if government wishes to encourage ne w industries, further processing, 
product diversification, or structural adjustment. Other types of 
research which might not be undertaken if there were no government 
intervention include conservation and environmental research and 
projects which are highly risky, have high costs or have costs and 
benefits which extend over a long time horizon. 
As stated by the LA.C. (1976) "An essential distinction to be 
drawn in determining the government's share of research costs is not the 
distribution of benefits between producers and consumers, but rather the 
relative magnitude of direct private benefits distributed by the market 
system and the external benefits for which the government must assume 
responsibility." With private funding of research, including funding via 
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a research levy, producers, processors and consumers tend to bear the 
costs of research in direct proportion to the direct financial benefits 
which they gain. This is generally true, regardless of the stage of 
industry at which the research is directed or the degree of competition 
at each stage. Hence, the current system of R.A.s undertaking 
agricultural research in New Zealand appears rational; since private 
interests (i.e.· producers and processors as well as both domestic and 
foreign consumers) gain the majority of the direct benefits, they pay 
the majority of the costs, While a proportion of funding is paid by 
government to cover the external benefits. It is concluded therefore 
that some continued government intervention in primary processing 
research is required to ensure that the substantial direct benefits to 
the industry and indirect ones to the general community are realised. 
5.1 Further Research 
However, before the optimal amount of government funds to research 
·can be determined, several points need to be considerede 
Firstly, there is a need to assess the profitability of processing 
research in New Zealand. Secondly, the amount and type of research 
currently undertaken by both the private sector (companies) and 
government should be determined. From such an analysis it could be 
determined whether underinvestment exists, either in general or with 
respect to particular sectors. Social costs and benefits would need to 
be accounted for in determining the reasons and remedies for any 
possible underinvestment in research. 
If it was found that there is less research being done than is 
nationally desirable, and that government assistance is justified, there 
are several further issues to resolve. These concern the nature and 
extent of government assistance; the criteria used for allocation of 
government funds to research, and the organisational efficiency of 
research structures. The choice of government intervention rests 
between research by government departments or research agencies, 
government subsidisation of other research agencies, or a mix of both. 
Some mixture of the two exists at present, with the emphasis on the 
former e However, the effectiveness of the present system needs to be 
evaluated, and comparisons made with alternative research structures and 
forms of funding. This would lead to more efficient decision making and 
ensure the optimal use of primary processing research funds in New 
Zealand. 
There is also a need for further development of the theory related 
to the distribution of costs and benefits from processing research, 
especially in the case of demand shifting technologYe Similarly, the 
theoretical results outlined in Sections 4.1 to 4.3 need to be re-
evaluated with the underlying simplifications relaxed. Quantification 
of some of the parameters would be useful in this respect, both of 
supply and demand elasticities and of elasticities of substitution 
(utilising the methodology of Gardner, 1975) and price transmissions. 
An assessment of the market power of processing firms would also be 
useful. 
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Finally, in view of the above comments, it would appear that
government involvement in R.A.s should continue. However, the
appropriate mix of government and private funding is not clear and
requires further investigation along the lines suggested.
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APPENDIX 1
SUMMARY OF STUDIES OF AGGREGATE AGRICULTURAL RESEARCH PRODUCTIVITY
Study Country Time Annual internal
rate of return (%)
Grlliches (1964) US 1949-59 35-40
Latimore US 1949-59 not significant
Evenson US 1949-59 47
Tang Japan 1880-1938 35
Jha & Evenson India 40
Khalon et al India 63
Peterson &
Fitzharris US 1967-72 34
Source: Arndt and Ruttan, 1975
Own Compilation
See Also:
Hastings
Po~ll and
Bushnell
Aust.
NZ & Aust.
39.
1947-75
1945-78
)
) Technological
) Change Indices.
)

APPENDIX 2 
DIsrRIBUTION OF cosrs AND BENEFITS OF RESEARCH 
A2.1 Introduction 
In this appendix a method of measuring the distribution of costs 
and benefits of agricultural research between producers, processors and 
domestic and overseas consumers is discussed. 
Firstly, the distribution of gains from cost reducing research is 
analysed, with respect to the domestic industry and to overseas 
consumers. The analysis is then extended to cover the gains to 
specific sectors of the industry (ie. producers and processors). 
Secondly, the parallel question of who bears the costs of such research 
is considered within the same framework. Finally, the effects of 
research which shift the demand curve by crea ting a ne w produc t, are 
considered, and a theoretical framework is developed for assessing costs 
and benefits of such research •. 
From this assessment it can be shown that in theory, product levies 
to· raise funds for research are an equitable method, as the "user pays" 
in direct proportion to the gains accruing to him from such research. 
A2.2 Methodology 
A2.2.1 Case 1: Cost-reducing research. 
(a) The Distribution of Gains 
The objective of undertaking some types of agricultural research 
is to achieve a reduction in unit production or processing costs (or 
equivalently, an increase in unit input or throughput yields). The 
benefits of such changes accrue to domestic producers, processors and 
consumers, and to overseas consumers. The distribution of benefits 
be t we.en produce rs and consumers depends upon ho w much of the fall in 
unit costs is actually transmitted through to the final price of the 
product. This transmission is influenced by both the elasticity of 
supply of producers and the elasticity of demand of consumers, as well 
as the degree of protection between domestic and world market prices. 
The distribution of the benefits from production research can be 
illustrated graphically (IoA.C., 1976). In Figure 1 demand is perfectly 
elastic (ie. the case where production sold internationally has no 
effect on price Po). An increase in productivity will reduce costs of 
production and shift the supply curve So to SI, increasing the quantity 
41. 
42. 
sold from Qo to Q1. (A parallel shift is assumed here: for 
convergent/divergent/pivotal shifts. see Rose, 1980). The gain accruing 
to produce rs is equivalent to the ha tched a rea. No benef its acc rue to 
consumers. 
If product demand is not perfectly elastic, as in Figure 2, an 
increase in productivity (So to Sl) will lower the price from Po to Pl. 
In this case the total benefits are distributed bet ween consumers and 
producers. The consumers gain by the fall in price from Po to PI; the 
producers' gain is represented by the hatched area. If some of the 
consumers are overseas not all the benefits from the productivity 
increase accrue to New Zealand. 
Where production is consumed both domestically and overseas, and 
given no distortions in pricing in either market, domestic prices will 
be determined by export prices. Thus, the elasticity of world demand for 
New Zealand products, rather than the elasticity of domestic demand, 
is the relevant elastici tyl0; under this assumption the change in 
product price resulting from a reduction in unit costs can be estimated 
as: 
ED - ESnz where ED is the elasticity of world demand, 
and ESnz is the elasticity of supply 
with respect to New Zealand products. 
The degree of market competition in export markets is an important 
factor determining the proportion of benefits accruing to domestic 
producers and consumers. Market protection can be explicitly accounted 
for, usirig price transmission elasticities, in measures of world export 
demand elasticities. Since consumers benefit only through a fall in 
prices (ignoring quality changes), the proportion of benefits flowing 
from the reduction in unit costs is the percentage fall in 
product prices, 
i.e. 
ESnz x 100 
ED - ESnz 
Domestic producers and processors, given the previous 
assumptions, are the only other beneficiaries, and hence their 
proportion is 100 minus the percentage accruing to consumers. The 
proportion of the total benefit accruing to consumers can be apportioned 
bet ween New Zealand and overseas consumers on the basis of the 
proportion of total production consumed by each. 
----------
10 Definition and calculation of export demand elasticities can be 
found elsewhere (ego lAC, 1976; Bredahl, 1979; Cronin, 1980). 
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This theory has been extended by Freebairn et.al.
determine whether it is the processors or producers who
research, and the distribution of gains from research at
levels of the system. Their results are summarised here:
(1982) to
gain from
different
(i) Technological change resulting in cost reductions gives benefits
to producers, processors and consumers.
(ii) A reduction in costs at any stage of the system (input costs,
farm production or marketing) gives the same pattern of benefits
to producers, processors and consumers.
(iii) This pattern of benefits is determined by the elasticity of
supply and demand at each stage. The gain to producers is
greater than the gain to consumers if the supply curve is
relatively less elastic than the demand curve.
(iv) Aggregate benefits are proportional to the cost reductions and
the initial level of output. (While the elasticities of the
supply and demand curves have a significant effect on the
distribution of gains, they have only a small effect on
aggregate gains).
(v) A research advance in anyone sector will provide benefits (or,
at least, convey no costs) to those in other sectors. In the
case where a particular sector's supply curve is horizontal, the
sector will gain no additional economic surplus (the downward
shift of the supply curve will be exactly off set by the downward
shift of" the price received).
(vi) The share of the benefits to anyone sector will be greater, the
more inelastic the supply curve for its output relative to that
for other sectors.
(vii) The distribution of benefits between final consumers and all
production sectors favours consumers only to the extent that
retail demand (or export demand in the national case) is not
perfectly elas tic.
(b) Distribution of Costs of Cost-Reducing Research
If research is financed by a levy on production and demand is
perfectly elastic this can be illustrated by a movement left wards of
the supply curve from Sl to So in Figure 1.11 In this case the producers
bear the full impact of the levy.
11 Figures 1 and 2 are used again here in order to avoid duplication
of diagrams. No relationship is implied with respect to the effect
of research gains illustrated in the previous section.
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If demand is less than perfectly elastic, as in Figure 2, and the 
supply curve shifts from SI to So due to a research levy, producers do 
not bear all the cost of the levy. Part of the levy is passed on to 
consumers in the form of a price rise (PI to Po~ 
Again, in this second case, if some of the consumers are overseas 
and if the research is financed by a levy, overseas consumers will also 
bear the costs of research in the same proportion as they share in the 
benefits, ie. on the basis of the proportion of New Zealand production 
exported. 
Thus, based on this theory, the relative distribution of the costs 
of research financed by a levy depends on the proportion of the 
commodity exported, the elasticity of export demand and the supply 
elastic ties of value added at each stage of the production sector. The 
more inelastic a sector's supply is relative to other sectors, the 
greater will be the share of research costs borne by that sector. 
A2.2.2 Case 2: Demand-increasing research. 
The distribution of research benefits and costs can also be 
illustrated for the case where the research is undertaken to increase 
demand (and hence price) by developing a new product from existing ra w 
material (eg. a n~w cheese) or a new process to expand overall demand 
(eg. a new needle for making tufted wool carpets). 
The allocation of the benefits of such research can be demonstrated 
with the use of Figure 3. If research is undertaken which shifts demand 
from Do to Dl quantit y demanded increases to Ql, and price paid a Iso 
increases, from Po to PI. As in Case 1, the total benefits are 
distributed between producers, processors and consumers. Here, though, 
producers and processors benefit from higher prices. Their gains are 
represented by the hatched area in Figure 3. 
Consumers, on the other hand, pay higher prices, but gain from the 
increased utility afforded by the new product. The gains to the 
consumer will be greater, and the gains to the producer smaller, the 
more elastic the supply curve is, relative to the demand curve. Since 
it can be assumed that the export demand elasticity for many New Zealand 
products is quite large and the supply elasticity quite 10 w, a large 
proportion of the benefits of demand creating research will accrue to 
New Zealand producers and processors. 
A similar effect would be seen from research at the marketing 
stage; changes in the marketing margin would be reflected as shifts in 
the demand curve, the direction depending upon the nature of the 
research. The distribution of benefits would be as outlined above, 
according to the elasticity of the particular sector's demand curve, 
relative to those of other sectors. 
By extending the theory, the issue of who bears the costs of 
research to shift the demand for an export product can be assessed. In 
Figure 4 if the research was financed by a levy on exports, the supply 
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schedule effectively shifts from S to (S + L). A new market equilibrium 
would be reached at a greater export volume Ql and a higher export price 
PI if the research and development were successful. The increase in 
national welfare would be the hatched area in Figure 4. 
Figure 5 shows the effect if the same research were undertaken, but 
paid for by government rather than producers. The demand schedule 
shif ts as before, but the suppl y schedule re mains at S. A ne w 
equilibrium is reached at quantity Q2 (greater than both QO and QI) and 
at a price P2 which would be intermediate between PO and Pl. The 
increase in national welfare is the hatched areas less the area marked 
"a". It can be shown mathematically (LA.C. 1976a) that this national 
welfare gain is less than when producers fund research through a levy. 
A2.3 Imperfect Competition 
Whilst it may be reasonable to treat consumers and farmers as 
perfect competitors, there are grounds for challenging the as sumption 
for the input supply, marketing and processing sectors (Freebairn et aI, 
1982). To some extent when there is imperfect competition in these 
sectors, technology-induced, production-cost changes will not be passed 
on in lower output prices, or passed back as higher returns to farmers. 
Thus, the results obtained in previous sections are modified (but not 
overturned) when the perfect competition assumption is relaxed. 
Monopolistic behaviour in the innovating sector increases the share 
going to that sector. It has been suggested that with a pure monopoly 
about half the cost reduction is passed on in lower prices to other 
sectors (Free bairn et a1, 1982). 
Whilst imperfect competition is recognised to exist, it is 
difficult to measure the extent of company-concentration, the levels of 
company profits, or the price formation process in agricultural 
industries. Thus, assessing monopoly power, whilst important in 
determining the allocation of research costs and benefits, is not 
feasible without more intensive study. Studies of the U.S. market (eg. 
George and King, 1971) indicate that a large part of farm price changes 
are passed on to retail within one quarter. They thus concluded that 
the competitive model may be a reasonable approximat·ion, particularly in 
the longer term. Therefore, in Ne w Zealand over the long term market 
price changes may be passed on by the proceSSing sector, but the short 
to medium-term situation is unclear. 
A2.4 Discussion 
An application of the above method to rural research in Australia 
can be found in lAC (1976), and the results are summarised in Table 5. 
No attempt is made here to measure the allocation of benefits from 
research within New Zealand, but appropriate data would be available 
from various sources. 
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TABLE 5
Distribution of the Direct Benefits of Rural Research
in Australia
49,
========================================================================
Consumer Nature of
Australian export
producer Australian Overseas market
% % %
Wool 85 to 88 s 11 to 15 Free
Beef and Veal 74 to 88 6 to 13 6 to 13 Protected
Wheat * 67 to 90 s 8 to 28 Free
Coarse grains 94 to 99 s s Free
Rice 99 s s Free
Mutton and lamb 58 to 68 25 to 32 7 to 10 Protected
Pigmeat 83 17 0 Protected
Manufactured dairy*
products 97 to 98 1 to 3 s Protected
Sugar* 91 to 93 s 5 to 7 Protected
========================================================================
s small (less than 5%)
* Ignores effect of two price schemes.
SOURCE: LA.C. (1976)
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The lAC study shows that most of the benefits of rural research in
Australia accrue to producers, as a large proportion of primary
commodities is exported, and faces a relatively elastic demand.
An extension of the theory suggests that a large proportion of
demand-shifting research benefits also accrues to producers, in the case
where export demand is relatively elastic - it is not possible to
determine exactly the shares of benefits accruing to each sector of
pr~uction without further detailed measurement of sector supply
responses. On the basis of estimates given in Table 5, it would appear
that in New Zealand a large proportion of benefits could accrue to the
farming sector, ho weve r, this potent ial will be reduced to the extent
that there is monopoly power in certain processing sectors in New
Zealand.
If funds for research are raised via a product levy, measurement of
the distribution of benefits becomes less important, because, as was
shown above, the costs of research tend to be borne in the same
proportion as the benefits are distributed.12 This argument, of course,
relates only to direct financial costs and benefits of research and
ignores the externality issues raised in Chapter 3 as justification for
additional assistance to research from government. The question of
'measurement of such social costs and benefits and hence, government or
tax-payer contributions, is not addressed in this paper. It is, though,
an issue of crucial importance and needs further research.
12 It has been pointed out (by A.G. Lloyd, in Edwards and Freebairn,
1982) that this analysis is static, while in fact the market
adjusts gradually to a production levy and to a (subsequent) cost
reduction. This delay bet ween raising a levy and increasing
productivity increases the producers' share (in present value
terms) of both the levy and the benefits from research. Thus,
the symmetry discussed in the text is retained.
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